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Three by Posner
Victor P. Goldberg*
If Richard Posner did not invent the term “efficient breach,” he at least was
its most aggressive marketer. I confess that nowadays I do not find the concept
particularly useful, but that does not detract from its value. It was a catalyst,
forcing scholars to consider the economic function of contract remedies. Any
assessment of Judge Posner’s contracts jurisprudence must acknowledge that
contribution.
In this paper, I will consider three of his opinions that appear with some
regularity in contracts casebooks—Northern Indiana Public Service Company v.
Carbon County Coal Company,1 Empire Gas v. American Bakeries,2 and Lake
River v. Carborundum.3 To anticipate my conclusions, in the first I find his
analysis and conclusions to be right (with one tiny quibble). In the second, I find
his conclusion on liability correct, given the statute. I believe he could have been
more aggressive on the remedy issue. Still, I cannot conclude that he was wrong.
On the third, I conclude that he got the outcome wrong and made a number of
other errors along the way.
I. NORTHERN INDIANA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. V. CARBON COUNTY COAL CO.4
In the late 1970’s, Northern Indiana Public Service Company (NIPSCO) was
concerned about the supply of fuel for its power plants. 5 As one element of its
strategy to deal with the expected increase in the cost of fossil fuels, NIPSCO
entered into a twenty-year contract with Carbon County for a fixed quantity—1.5
million tons per year—of coal.6 The base price was $24, and by 1985 the indexed
price had risen to $44. The price adjustment mechanism was asymmetrical,
setting a floor (itself subject to escalation) but no ceiling. This worked reasonably
well for the first few years, but when fuel prices collapsed in the early 1980’s, the
contract price was well above market. The Indiana public utility commission

* Victor P. Goldberg is a Jerome L. Greene Professor of Transactional Law Emeritus at Columbia
University School of Law.
1. 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
2. 840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988). See also VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW 123–29
(2012) [hereinafter F RAMING]; Victor P. Goldberg, The Lost Volume Seller: R.I.P., 2 CRITERION J. ON
INNOVATION 205 (2017) [hereinafter Lost Volume].
3. 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
4. 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir.1986).
5. Id. at 267.
6. Id.
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directed NIPSCO to make a good faith effort to buy power from other utilities
that would sell it power at a price lower than the cost of internal generation (socalled “economy purchase orders”).7 Because of this, NIPSCO was unable to
pass the increased coal prices on to its customers. It stopped taking coal from
Carbon County and sought a declaration that it be excused, invoking the force
majeure clause and impossibility and frustration. 8
Judge Posner’s rejection of all the excuse arguments is spot-on. The force
majeure clause would allow NIPSCO to stop taking coal “for any cause beyond
[its] reasonable control . . . including but not limited to . . . orders or acts of civil
. . . authority . . . which wholly or partly prevent . . . the utilizing . . . of the
coal.”9 NIPSCO argued that the economy purchase orders were covered by this,
but as the Judge observed, the orders did not prevent NIPSCO from using the
coal; it just did not allow NIPSCO to pass the coal costs on to ratepayers. Having
disposed of the force majeure clause, he then turned to the excuses recognized in
the doctrine—impossibility and frustration.
He framed the matter in terms of how the parties would have assigned the
risk:
Thus the proper question in an ‘impossibility’ case is not whether the
promisor could not have performed his undertaking but whether his
nonperformance should be excused because the parties, if they had
thought about the matter, would have wanted to assign the risk of the
contingency that made performance impossible or uneconomical to the
promisor or to the promisee; if to the latter, the promisor is excused. 10
Since the contract had explicitly assigned the risk of price change, he concluded,
the promisor would bear the risk.
I have only one quibble with his disposition of the excuse arguments—his
discussion of Krell v. Henry,11 the leading case of frustration. After Edward VII’s
appendicitis resulted in the postponement of the coronation procession, a
substantial amount of litigation ensued, Krell v. Henry being only one of a slew
of cases. Krell had rented his room to Henry for the obvious purpose of seeing
the procession.12 The price was £75, with £25 up front and the remainder due, it
turned out, after the postponement.13 Judge Posner’s take: “The question was, to
which party did the contract (implicitly) allocate the risk? Surely Henry had not
intended to insure Krell against the possibility of the coronation’s being
postponed, since Krell could always relet the room, at the premium rental, for the
7. Id.
8. Id. at 268.
9. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 799 F.2d at 274.
10. Id. at 276.
11. (1903) 2 Eng. Rep. 740 (K.B.).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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coronation’s new date. So, Henry was excused.” 14
I have no problem with the conclusion, but the rationale is problematic. First,
there was no guarantee that the substitute procession would take the same route;
even if it did, there was no reason to believe it would be as attractive. (In fact, the
subsequent procession did pass by Krell’s flat, but since many dignitaries chose
not to return to London, the value of the viewing sites apparently fell.) 15 Second,
this explanation does not account for the initial payment of £25. Since per capita
income in England at the time was £45, this was not a trivial sum. Although
Henry had dropped his claim for the return of his prepayment, in another of the
Coronation cases, Chandler v. Webster,16 the court was confronted with the
question. There, the court held that the parties should be left where they were at
the time of the breach. 17 Henry would not have been allowed to recover his £25
and Chandler could not recover the £100 he had already paid and was liable for
the remaining amount that had been due prior to the postponement. I happen to
think that the court in Chandler was correct, but it is clear that the ability to relet
was irrelevant.18
Having concluded that NIPSCO should not be excused, Judge Posner then
turned to the remedy. He accepted the jury verdict assessing damages. 19 This was
the present value of the difference between two revenue streams—the amount
Carbon County would have received had the contract been performed and the
amount it would have received given the projected prices. 20 Carbon County
wanted more; it asked for specific performance. 21 Judge Posner’s rejection of this
claim had two components. First, Carbon County claimed that if the mine were
shut down third parties (workers and local merchants) would suffer.22 He rejected
the argument because the claims of third parties were irrelevant and, anyway,
there was no reason to believe that awarding specific performance would result in
the mine operating.23 Second, he noted that the most efficient outcome would be
to shut down the mine; awarding specific performance would not result in
continued production. 24 It would simply mean giving Carbon County “bargaining

14. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 799 F.2d at 277.
15. VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, RETHINKING CONTRACT LAW AND CONTRACT DESIGN 140 (2015)
[hereinafter RETHINKING].
16. (1904) 1 Eng. Rep. 493 (K.B.).
17. Id.
18. The House of Lords eventually overturned Chandler, holding that if performance were frustrated
there must be restitution of any prepayments. I have argued that this was a mistake—one that has unfortunately
been adopted in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. RETHINKING, supra note 15, at chs. 11–12.
19. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 799 F.2d at 281.
20. Id. at 279–80.
21. Id. at 279.
22. Id.
23. “[T]he workers and merchants in Hanna assumed the risk that the coal mine would have to close
down if it turned out to be uneconomical. The contract with NIPSCO did not guarantee that the mine would
operate throughout the life of the contract.” Id. at 280.
24. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 799 F.2d at 279.
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leverage with NIPSCO, and we can think of no reason why the law should give it
such leverage.”25
II. EMPIRE GAS V. AMERICAN BAKERIES26
Here, Judge Posner did a good job navigating a poorly designed statute (2306(1)). My concern is not with the liability issue on which the case was decided.
Rather, it is on the remedy phase, which received almost no attention. To be sure,
counsel did not help—the issue was not raised on appeal.27 The basic facts are
well known. American Bakeries Company (ABC) operated a fleet of trucks to
deliver its products. Rising gas prices in the 1970’s led it to consider installing
converter units in its trucks that would enable them to switch between gasoline
and propane at the flip of a switch. 28 It entered into a four-year requirements
contract with Empire Gas for all its propane purchases and for the conversion
units as well.29 The contract said that over the four years ABC would purchase
approximately 3,000 conversion units “more or less, depending upon the
requirements of Buyer.” 30 The conversion units, per Posner, were supplied as an
accommodation.31 The price was $750 per unit. 32 The propane price was to be
determined by a loosely worded meeting competition clause. 33
ABC changed its collective mind for reasons unspecified and took nothing.
Empire sued, invoking 2-306(1) which restricted the purchaser’s freedom to take
“requirements as may occur in good faith except that no quantity unreasonably
disproportionate to any stated estimate . . . may be tendered or demanded.”34 That
left two questions: was ABC’s decision in good faith; and was zero unreasonably
disproportionate to 3,000? I have argued elsewhere 35 that it was a mistake to ask
both questions. If the seller wanted to constrain the buyer’s discretion, there were
many contractual devices available and the parties were in a better position to
decide this than were the codifiers. But Judge Posner was stuck with a statute,
however foolish it might be.
He argued that the statute should be interpreted asymmetrically. It would
prevent the buyer from ordering too much. Conceivably, if the market price
exceeded the contract price, an opportunistic buyer could order an unlimited

25.
26.
2, at 205.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
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Id. at 279–80.
840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988). See also FRAMING, supra note 2, at 123–29; Lost Volume, supra note
It was, as we shall see, raised at trial. The trial judge’s disposition was not challenged on appeal.
Empire Gas Corp., 840 F.2d at 1335.
Id. (explaining the contract applied only to locations where Empire had dispensing equipment).
Id.
Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1335.
Empire Gas Corp., 840 F.2d at 1335.
U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (AM. LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).
FRAMING, supra note 2, at ch. 5.
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amount of the goods, forcing the seller into bankruptcy. However, since
discretion on the down side was bounded by zero, Judge Posner reasoned, the
buyer’s ability to behave opportunistically was limited. 36 So he was able to cut
down the reach of the statute. But that still left “good faith.” Good faith meant,
he asserted, that the buyer had to have some valid business reason. “I changed
my mind” would not be enough. Since ABC refused to offer any business reason,
he concluded that it had not acted in good faith and therefore it had breached.
The jury found that had it not breached, ABC would have bought 2,242
conversion units over the four years and it awarded Empire damages of
$3,354,963 and with little discussion, Judge Posner approved the award. 37
I think the liability result is unfortunate, but the problem was the statute, not
the judge. Perhaps, as the dissent suggested, he could have put the burden of
proof on the plaintiff to show that ABC’s behavior was not in good faith or, more
of a stretch, in bad faith. My concern is with the remedy, which received little
attention. The only remedy issue that was argued before Judge Posner was
whether Empire’s expert witness was correct in assuming that because propane
was so much cheaper, after the units were installed ABC would use only
propane.38 He concluded that the assumption was reasonable. 39
The jury award had two components. It awarded $642,062 for the conversion
units and $2,612,901 for the propane. 40 Where did these numbers come from?
Empire’s primary business was selling propane and, as Judge Posner noted, it
supplied conversion units as an accommodation to its customers. Empire did not
produce conversion units; it bought them in a competitive market. Why would
there be any damages at all? If market conditions for conversion units hadn’t
changed, there should be no damages on that score. Moreover, the meeting
competition clause would suggest that the market/contract price differential for
propane should also be zero. So how did this happen?
The answer is that the jury treated Empire as a lost volume seller. The
decision did not mention the lost volume seller (2-708(2)), nor did the briefs to
the Court of Appeals. However, ABC did raise the issue at trial, but the judge
rejected it:
ABC urges that, as a matter of law, Empire failed to prove damages as a
result of the alleged breach of contract, thereby mandating judgment for
36. Empire Gas Corp., 840 F.2d at 1334–35.
37. Id. at 1341–42.
38. Judge Posner dismissed ABC’s other concerns: “A great weakness of American Bakeries’ case was
its failure to present its own estimate of damages, in the absence of which the jury could have no idea of what
adjustments to make in order to take account of American Bakeries’ arguments. American Bakeries may have
feared that if it put in its own estimate of damages the jury would be irresistibly attracted to that figure as a
compromise. But if so, American Bakeries gambled double or nothing, as it were; and we will not relieve it of
the consequences of its risky strategy.” Id. at 1342.
39. Id.
40. Brief and Appendix for Defendant-Appellant at 39, Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d
1333 (7th Cir. 1988) (No. 82 C 815).
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ABC. With regard to the damage award for lost profits on the sale of the
conversion units, it takes the position that Empire was not entitled to lost
profit damages because it failed to prove first that a contract-market
formula of damages was inadequate.
* * *
Any plaintiff who seeks to prove that damages recoverable under § 2708(1) will not put him in the same position as performance, should be
permitted to prove lost profits under § 2-708(2). J. White & R.
Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
§7-11 at 279 (2d ed. 1980). In this case, Empire chose to undertake the
burden of proving lost profits, Tr. 2472, and the jury concluded that it
sustained its burden and accordingly made an award for lost profits on
the sale of the conversion units; the conclusion was reasonable in light of
the evidence.41
For some reason, ABC failed to pursue the matter on appeal. Doing a bit of
arithmetic, this works out to $286 per conversion unit, 38% of the price. In effect,
the jury found that ABC had agreed to pay $286 for the option to buy conversion
units for an additional $464, units that were available in a competitive market. 42
Why, on earth, would ABC have needed to pay any option price, let alone the
implied option price of 38%? The question was never put before Judge Posner.
Should he have asked? That would be beyond what most judges would be able to
do; but perhaps an exceptional judge, like Judge Posner, could have posed the
question.
III. LAKE RIVER V. CARBORUNDUM43
The Judge did a nice job explaining why he believed that liquidated damages
clauses negotiated between reasonably sophisticated business firms should be
enforceable. However, he claimed to have been bound by Illinois’ law.44 The
litigators framed the dispute in terms of liquidated damages versus penalty
clause, and he accepted that. I don’t think he should have accepted their framing

41. Id. at 9–11.
42. $750–$286=$464.
43. 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985).
44. Id. at 1289. On this view the refusal to enforce penalty clauses is (at best) paternalistic—and it seems
odd that courts should display parental solicitude for large corporations. But however this may be, we must be
on guard to avoid importing our own ideas of sound public policy into an area where our proper judicial role is
more than usually deferential. The responsibility for making innovations in the common law of Illinois rest s
with the courts of Illinois, and not with the federal courts in Illinois. And like every other state, Illinois,
untroubled by academic skepticism of the wisdom of refusing to enforce penalty clauses against sophisticated
promisors . . . continues steadfastly to insist on the distinction between penalties and liquidated damages.
Id.
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since there was enough available in the record to allow for an alternative reading
of the contract. I have two additional criticisms. First, he failed to recognize that
there would be a different damage remedy for the actual situation and his
hypothetical example of an anticipatory repudiation. Second, his distinction
between this contract and a take-or-pay contract doesn’t work. Analytically, there
is no difference.
Lake River promised to bag and distribute Ferro Carbo, an abrasive powder
produced by Carborundum. 45 The clause at the center of the controversy was a
minimum quantity guarantee; Carborundum would ship to Lake River a
minimum of 22,500 tons over the course of three years.46 Because of an
economic downturn in the steel industry, at the end of the three years only about
12,000 tons had been shipped. 47 Lake River asked for payment for all 22,500
tons, and Carborundum refused, arguing that this would amount to a penalty. 48
Reversing the trial judge, Judge Posner agreed that it was a penalty and limited
Lake River to recovery for the contract price less the avoided costs.49
He went through an arithmetic example in which he hypothesized certain
aspects of Lake River’s costs.50 If Lake River had bagged the minimum, he
estimated that it would have expected a profit of $107,000. 51 If it only bagged
12,000 tons it would have expected a profit on the goods actually bagged of only
$19,000; but if that were topped up by payment for the 22,500-ton minimum, the
profit would have been $260,000, over two times what Lake River would have
made had Carborundum performed. 52 He threw in a few more numerical
examples, but the basic point was that for any quantity less than 22,500 tons,
Lake River would have been better off than if Carborundum had performed (that
is, had shipped 22,500 tons).53 Hence, he argued, this was an unenforceable
penalty clause. 54 The contrast between his freewheeling estimation of Lake
River’s cost structure (with no help from the litigators) and his passive
acceptance of Empire Gas’s damage claim is stark.
The litigators, the trial judge, and Judge Posner all ignored a crucial clause in
the contract (which was in the record). Lake River promised to bag a maximum
of 400 tons per week. Conceivably, Carborundum could have had Lake River bag
up to 60,000 tons over the three years—almost three times the contract minimum.
The contract gave Carborundum flexibility; it had the option to take up to 400
tons per week for the duration. The flexibility was valuable to Carborundum in
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 1286.
Id.
Id.
Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d at 1286.
Id. at 1292–93.
Id. at 1290–91.
Id. at 1290.
Id.
Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d at 1291.
Id.
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that it allowed it to adapt to changed market conditions. But it was costly for
Lake River to provide. It had to be ready, willing, and able to bag 400 tons each
and every week. If the flexibility were more valuable to Carborundum than Lake
River’s cost of providing it, there was room for a deal. The “price” would fall
somewhere between the value to the former and the cost to the latter. I put price
in quotations because the price need not be, and in fact was not, explicit. The
contract and the opinion only mention one specific cost Lake River incurred in
reliance on the contract—the purchase for $89,000 of a new bagging system.
However, it had to maintain the capacity (including the labor force) to be
prepared to receive 400 tons each and every week, lest it breach the contract. 55
Carborundum was buying flexibility; the minimum quantity clause determined
the price.
Lake River had tried to argue that the damages would not be as large as
Posner’s calculations suggested because it had a duty to mitigate. 56 Posner
rejected that argument:
Lake River argues that it would never get as much as the formula
suggests, because it would be required to mitigate its damages. This is a
dubious argument on several grounds. First, mitigation of damages is a
doctrine of the law of court-assessed damages, while the point of a
liquidated-damages clause is to substitute party assessment; and that
point is blunted, and the certainty that liquidated-damages clauses are
designed to give the process of assessing damages impaired, if a
defendant can force the plaintiff to take less than the damages specified
in the clause, on the ground that the plaintiff could have avoided some of
them.57
Lake River’s argument would have been counter-productive if it were aimed
at the actual situation—a shortfall at the end of three years. However, if instead
its argument concerned mitigation after the defendant had anticipatorily
repudiated the contract, it would have been correct. And that leads us to the
second point. To justify his argument that the damage remedy would be
ridiculously large, Judge Posner presented a hypothetical. Suppose that the
contract had been breached on Day 1, he said. Lake River would be paid the
entire amount (over $500,000) for doing nothing, and that would obviously be a
penalty. However, that is wrong. If Carborundum had repudiated on Day 1, then
Lake River would no longer have had to maintain the ability to perform—its
resources would be freed for other purposes. 58 Damages would reflect Lake
55. Judge Posner’s calculations of fixed and variable costs did not take account of Lake River’s
obligation to maintain the capacity to bag 400 tons per week.
56. Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d at 1291.
57. Id.
58. I confess that I didn’t quite see this when I first wrote about the case. Compare RETHINKING, supra
note 15, at 82–83, with Victor P. Goldberg, Reckoning Contract Damages: Valuation of the Contract as an
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River’s ability to mitigate; if market conditions hadn’t changed, damages would
likely be nil (assuming Lake River had not yet purchased the $89,000 bagging
machine).
Was the minimum quantity contract different from a take-or-pay contract, as
Judge Posner argued? He wrote: “If, as appears not to be the case here, but would
often be the case in supplying natural gas, a supplier’s fixed costs were a very
large fraction of his total costs, a take-or-pay clause might well be a reasonable
liquidation of damages.” 59 The key feature of the take-or-pay contracts is not the
high fixed costs; rather, just as in the Lake River contract, the key is the benefit
and cost of providing flexibility. The buyer values flexibility and the seller is
willing to provide it at a cost.
In a take-or-pay contract, what happens if the buyer fails to take the
minimum in a particular period? There would not be “liquidation of damages,”
since there would be no breach. The only breach would be the buyer’s failure to
pay the seller the contract price times the shortfall; the contract would remain
alive. If, however, the buyer in a take-or-pay contract were to repudiate its future
obligations, the remedy would not be the price times the minimum take for each
of the remaining years (the “reasonable liquidation of damages”). Rather, since
the seller would no longer be bound, damages would reflect the seller’s ability to
use the freed up resources elsewhere. 60 That is, damages would take into account
the seller’s mitigation.
The take-or-pay contract has multiple periods while the minimum quantity
contract has but one. Analytically, there is no difference. In both instances, the
buyer would be liable for the shortfall if at the end of the relevant period it had
not met the minimum. If the buyer were to anticipatorily repudiate, the minimum
would be neither liquidated damages nor a penalty. Damages would take into
account the buyer’s mitigation. If the goods could be used elsewhere, mitigation
would focus on the market/contract differential. If the best response to the
buyer’s termination were to close the project down, then damages would
compare the expected future revenue stream with the costs avoided. That, recall,
was the remedy that Judge Posner approved in NIPSCO.61
Could Judge Posner have ignored the fact that the parties framed the issues in
terms of liquidated damages versus penalty? The materials were there in the
record, although the parties did not do a good job of highlighting them. I think
that he should have, especially since he was so skeptical of the penalty clause
notion to start out with. His failure to do so, I suspect, was not a matter of judicial
Asset, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 301 (2018) [hereinafter Reckoning].
59. Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d at 1292.
60. The contract could have a number of bells and whistles—an early termination option, a makeup
clause, a price adjustment mechanism (indexing, renegotiation, etc.)—that would complicate damage
estimation. I argue elsewhere that the problem should be viewed as determining the change in the value of an
asset (the contract). See Reckoning, supra note 58, at 301.
61. Of course, the NIPSCO contract was for a fixed quantity, not a take-or-pay. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v
Carbon Cty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 1986).
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restraint. Instead, it reflected his conflation of two distinct problems: a shortfall
after the performance date had passed (the actual situation in Lake River) and a
repudiation of future performance. In the former, there could be no mitigation; in
the latter, damage assessment had to take mitigation into account. In neither was
the liquidated damages/penalty distinction helpful.
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